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Mahmūd II. 1789-1839

SULTAN MAHMOUD, 50

Sultan d. Türkei

AND

MEHEMET ALI PASHA.

BY THE AUTHOR OF

"ENGLAND, FRANCE, RUSSIA, & TURKEY."

[Wright, David]

Third Edition.

LONDON:

JAMES RIDGWAY & SONS, 169, PICCADILLY.

MDCCCXXXV.

A167/528

Bayerische
Staatsbibliothek
München

LONDON :
PRINTED BY T. BRETTELL, RUPERT STREET, HAYMARKET.

ADVERTISEMENT.

THE following observations, were written in October last; but the position of the powers, and of the Turkish rivals, is the same, in as far as the arguments here adduced are drawn from the facts stated. Within these few months, the designs of Russia have been considerably matured. She has decided on, and commenced a large augmentation of her fleet in the Black Sea; she has commenced fortifying Sevastopol; she has detached France from England; and she has gained so much time for the progress of demoralization in Turkey. On the other hand, her winter campaign in the Caucasus has failed; the Treaty of the 8th July is unmasked; and a spirit of curiosity, with respect to her proceedings and objects, has been awakened in England.

ADVERTISING

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of peasant, and the winter campaign, in the
who reads the history, and the fate of the
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ignorance of the most important part of present
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will respect to her proceedings and objects
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opposed - not opposed, but
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SULTAN MAHMOUD,
AND
MEHEMET ALI PASHA.

FOR fourteen years, that is, ever since the commencement of the Greek revolution, the Governments of England, France, and Russia, have appeared to be guided in their Eastern relations and policy, by perfect identity of views and interests. Every where, and on every occasion, they are to be found side by side—concerting measures, exchanging assurances of amity and good-will, drawing up protocols, signing treaties, and destroying enemies. Yet there is not a child or peasant in the East, there can be no individual who reads the papers in England and France, ignorant of the most important fact of present history, namely, that the eastern interests of England and France on the one hand, and of Russia on the other, are not only not identical, but opposed—not opposed merely, but at war.

The treaty of protection forced by Russia on the Porte, had appeared for a moment to put an end to this monstrous union, and to establish, in the

eyes of the East, a visible opposition of the policy of England to that of Russia. England and France remonstrated—menaced, it is said—at all events, sent fleets to the Levant. Russia was known to return to their demands, not only unsatisfactory, but insulting answers. The moment of determination seemed at length arrived; but, alas! Russia was again allowed to do just as she pleased; the unsatisfactory, the insulting answers were submitted to; the fleets were withdrawn, and the policy of the three Courts again subsided into its wonted unanimity; that is, to such perfect blindfoldedness and subserviency, on the part of England and France, that Russia had nothing to complain of.

Russia has nothing to complain of in the energy with which the representatives of England and France have laboured to prevent a collision between Mehemet Ali and the Sultan. These representatives either had instructions, and acted on them, or had not, and laboured to prevent a catastrophe, which however available, with ordinary forethought could not be so while the Governments at home had neither opinions nor plans, and even doubted the existence of Russian designs. But, when the French Government puts forth a justification of its conduct in its official organ, and claims merit for maintaining a state of repose, the interruption of which would endanger the peace of Europe, it really is time to call the attention of those who are interested in the main-

tenance of peace, to the precariousness of its continuance—declared by the fact, that the notes of England and France and Russia, have severally and emphatically asserted to the Porte, that the peace of Europe would be compromised, by any displacement of Turkish troops towards Syria.

Is this, then, the result of twenty years of the prosperous peace established, as never peace was established before, by the unanimous consent of assembled Europe? Is war or peace in Europe, contingent, on an “illusion of Constantinople,” or “a caprice of Alexandria?” It is only after the unblushing, and almost unconscious avowal, of so frightful a position, that we can be prepared for the diplomatic inspirations of the French Cabinet, and the assertion, by its own official organ, of the determination of the French Cabinet, to watch over and preserve SUCH A *statu quo*. That determination, unfortunately, is common to England. It can have been taken only as a means of staving off the decision of both, on the whole question. They have not yet reasoned to a conclusion, on the affairs of Turkey; they are not prepared to act; and only as a cloak for inaction, can they still affect to think it possible to bring about a reconciliation between the vassal and the sovereign. But this delay will not await their decision. Events may come upon them before they are prepared. Russia will lead these events, and profit by them. But we almost feel certain of an approaching term to this inaction,

in reflecting on the hollowness of the fallacies by which it has been maintained. These fallacies are, that a reconciliation can take place, or that Mehemet Ali can succeed Mahmoud on the throne of Constantinople; both impossibilities, as we trust we shall be able to show.

The annals of the empire, for a long series of years, are filled with the rebellions of Pashas, who, with more or less means, for a longer or shorter period of time, have withdrawn their provinces from the control of the Porte—have invaded other provinces—have formed foreign alliances—have been regarded abroad as founders of new dynasties, but who have all, without a single exception, been in the end destroyed. The cause of their failure has been, that the popular interests coincided with the interests of the Porte. The Pashas made use of the military means only, which they were enabled to purchase by the treasures they could accumulate; this necessary pressure, undermining their authority, by the exactions to which they had recourse to supply these demands. Some of these rebels have been distinguished by great talents, and great virtues; but the heads of the whole of them have graced the Seraglio gates*, and their destruction has always been hailed as a deliverance by the people they governed.

The only exceptions to this rule are to be found

* The present Sultan is the first who has treated rebels systematically with kindness, after getting them in his power.

in Greece and Servia. In Greece, however, no Pasha rose against his sovereign, a people arose. The Greeks fought for their independence, and achieved it: it may be of little value to them, it may be precarious, thanks to European theories; but it was obtained against the whole weight of the Ottoman power, because the whole population thought itself interested in the struggle; so in Servia, the mass of the people was interested in the contest, and it is interested in the sage independence it has acquired, which, securing them from the abuses of the Turkish administrators, leaves them a portion of the empire, benefiting by its simplicity, its moderate taxation, and general protection.

In Egypt, on the contrary, we find the circumstances that have invariably characterised a Pasha's revolt. The people wholly uninterested, and the Pasha maintaining himself solely by the sword. Mehemet Ali's military means are far greater than those possessed by any former chief who has aimed at independence; his resources are greater; he has troops disciplined; he has a navy; he has been instructed and supported by a foreign power; he has been successful; and he has hitherto, by the superiority of his fleet, prevented a descent. But, notwithstanding the superior means, the basis of his power is precisely the same as that of so many of his predecessors in the same views, he must exhaust and alienate his provinces by the necessities of his position. Possessed of the next to

inexhaustible Egypt, it became a necessity of existence to him, to extend his dominion ; and when Syria, Damascus, and the ancient kingdom of Cilicia, were added to them ; when he had conquered his sovereign, and overran Asia Minor, it was impossible for him to disband a single soldier ;—new levies, new conscriptions, were the consequences ; fresh imposts were the result ; and at this moment he appears to be as straitened, in these vast acquisitions, as two years ago in Egypt : yet, notwithstanding all these superior means, other insurgents have had greater success than he ; other Pashas have reached the city itself,—have entered the gate of Bliss,—have pulled down and set up Sultans. If the victories of Homs and Conieh, were new incidents in the history of the empire ; *if resistance to authority did mean rebellion in Turkey*, then indeed, but only then, might Mehemet Pasha be looked on as a pretender to the crown.

His position is then clearly identical with that of so many Pashas, who, for a time, have maintained themselves against the Porte, and given rise, in proportion to their strength and their connection with Europe, to large expectations. Six hundred years has the present dynasty occupied a throne, against which not only has no rebellion been successful, but against which no rebel has ever raised his hand, until Mehemet Ali, with the view of overturning it. Yet it possessed no standing army ;—it was maintained by no high and

powerful aristocracy, its supremacy, remotely deduced from administrative principles, into which we cannot now enter, was immediately supported by deep and universal conviction, the result of these principles ;—by opinion, in fact, the action of which is now modified, and the nature of which it is exceedingly difficult for an European to comprehend. At least, let him not neglect the fact.

The whole history of the Ottoman empire proves, that such a position must ever be one of implacable hostility to the Porte.

But supposing that this hostility were not a necessary consequence of this position, under ordinary circumstances, must it not be so at present, when it is so advantageous to Russia; when Russia is protector of the Sultan, and can so easily work on the minds of two men, whose hatred to each other, all *her* influence is incapable of moderating at this very moment. While it is the interest and object of Russia to maintain the schism between Mehemet Ali and the Sultan, it is not her object to bring it to a rupture until she is prepared ; and that she could not be, while there was an English squadron at Vourla.

Confessedly the reconciliation of Mehemet Ali, and the Sultan, is necessary to the independence of the empire. Is this object to be attained, by rendering Mehemet Ali independent? The proposition bears absurdity on its very face. Would a fiction of terms alter the facts of the case? Would a nominal separation take away from

either, the power of injuring the other? Would it take away the inclination, the necessity of mutual destruction? Would it increase the respectability of the Sultan, in the eyes of his nation? Would it sever those profound and immemorial bonds, that connect the affections, the prejudices, the interests, of the inhabitants of those provinces, to the Porte, and which impose on it the necessity of unceasing endeavours to recover them?

The weakness of the Sultan is equally necessary to the existence of Mehemet Ali, nominally independent, or nominally subject: the destruction of Mehemet must in every case be the first object of the Sultan,—an object to which he will sacrifice, as he has sacrificed, the dearest interests and the external independence of his empire.

But let us suppose impossible things. Let us suppose Mehemet Ali wholly detached from the Porte, and disposed to live in peace and amity with the Sultan. Let us suppose Russia still behind the Dnieper, and exercising no influence whatever on Turkey—even then, we maintain that it would be utterly impossible for peace to be maintained between the two Turkish rivals.

Meheemet Ali has not only raised a military power, to the support of which his country is inadequate; but he has had recourse to fiscal measures, for the exaction of his revenue, which augment the exhausting effects of its pressure. While he is obliged to augment his expenditure,

the production of the country rapidly diminishes. In Candia, his system has been impracticable; in Syria, it is equally so. He must, therefore, make his army and his fleet support themselves. He must look to new conquests abroad, to support himself at home; and to which side can his eyes be turned—to Bagdad, or to Asia Minor? Mehemet Ali must have conquests; he has an army superior in the field to that of the Sultan. He has a dissatisfied country, where the most trifling invasion necessarily rallies all discontent, and where his only safeguard is the idea of his power. He must, therefore, attack the dominions of the Sultan, because they are the only food within reach; he will attack them, because his attack can alone prevent an invasion.

On the other hand, the Porte is led by a sense of right and injury to attack Mehemet Ali—to foment discontent—to profit by it; and this moral necessity is not less imperative than the practical necessity is for Mehemet Ali; but supposing this cause not to exist—supposing Egypt, separated from the Porte from time immemorial—supposing the Sultan, animated with the most friendly dispositions towards Mehemet Ali—supposing the temptations removed of his weakness in Egypt—supposing again the influence of Russia not to exist—even then the obliged hostility of Mehemet Ali must produce hostility against him. The two cannot co-exist, from the moment that either is prepared to attack the other. If left to themselves,

there cannot be a shadow of a doubt, as we shall afterwards see, that Mehemet Ali would be destroyed. But, in the meantime, all progress is arrested; the rivalry exhausts the Empire; and, what is of far more importance, they will not be left to themselves. The powers of Europe will interfere. Russia is at hand, with her plans fixed, and her mind made up. England and France will not deliberately suffer her to have all the game in her own hands; they, too, will interfere: but if they interfere with the idea of preventing the parties from coming to blows, we hesitate not in declaring our conviction, that they had much better leave Russia at once to make the best of it. It is childish, to speak of reconciling interests that cannot coincide; of strengthening an empire by the union of parts necessarily hostile. Mehemet Ali and Mahmoud have ceased to struggle, from exhaustion alone. The relations between them, at this moment, are those of hostility. They lie, like two gladiators, on the arena, at rest, because neither has strength to reach and dispatch the other; with this difference, that the life of the one is on the surface; the life of the other, however stunned and bruised he may be, lies deeper than his antagonist's sword can reach.

England and France are powerful; but there is no power without intelligence. They may destroy, with ease, both the Sultan, and Mehemet Ali, if they choose to do so. But they can only support the one by the destruction of the other. They

had better destroy the Sultan at once, and set up Mehemet Ali in his place, than deliver the empire to Russia, the necessary consequence of pursuing an impracticable policy; the conciliation of two irreconcilable interests, which puts them in a state of hostility with both.

They have fortunately had time to convince themselves, by facts and experience, of this truth. What step have they yet been able to induce Mehemet Ali to make towards the settlement of any one of the stipulations of Conieh? and yet how easy it is for England to command Mehemet Ali; her will is law for him, when she understands how that will is to be expressed. Not that her power can alter his interests, but it may influence his conduct. England may, therefore, order Mehemet Ali to make such and such concessions; but events she will be too late to control, unless she anticipates them, prepares for them, and acts with knowledge and with system.

And how can a collision be prevented? By threats? Of what—of *after vengeance*? Are fleets to be kept on the Syrian coasts, as long as an indefinite misunderstanding causes us to watch over an independence at some future period to be established? And what can fleets do? One army on the Taurus, and another at Bagdad, can alone secure the inaction of the antagonists; and only when two such armies are encamped in

Turkey, will the time be arrived to talk of prevention.

If, therefore, France and England do intend to take a useful part in the affairs of Turkey, they must make their election *between* Mehemet Ali and the Sultan.

But before entering into this question, we must distinctly state, that this necessity of choosing between Mehemet Ali and the Sultan, is imposed solely by the position and attitude of Russia; but for this attitude we might allow the Sultan and the Pasha quietly to fight out their battles, as so many have already been fought; we might even rejoice in the independence of Egypt, which, if Russia ceased to menace Turkey, might become the means of forwarding those ameliorations which it at present arrests: but, as the question stands, every movement involves the whole of Europe. England, France, and more emphatically than either, Russia, has declared to the Sultan, that any act against his vassal, compromised his own crown and the peace of Europe. If the peace of Europe is involved in the collision between the two Mussulmen, there must be opposed interests in Europe to back them. There must be balanced chances of success. We, certainly, are one of the parties engaged, compromised, committed, endangered; and is it possible, since the struggle can be brought about

by the rupture between Mehemet Ali and the Sultan, since it must be brought about by that event, that we have not yet chosen our champion in that field; and instead of concerting our plans, *think* only of effecting a reconciliation between the two? which is in fact a prolongation of danger, and of the chances of defeat. But if we choose to seek the evil, and to check it at its source—if we choose to meet Russia in the Black Sea; if we resolve that she is no longer to interfere in the affairs of Turkey or Europe, then, indeed, there will be no necessity for choosing between the Sultan and the Pasha; we then dictate our terms to them, and to Russia.

The question between Mehemet Ali and the Sultan is rested in Europe, exclusively on personal considerations. We believe, on the contrary, that the most important and decisive considerations are to be drawn from position; and, above all, from the habits, interests, and wishes of the nation—considerations which an European is very apt to neglect; *first*, because he does not understand them, and, *secondly*, because his judgment can exercise itself alone on preconceived and European notions. We will, therefore, first compare the characters of both, as these have influenced their respective administrations; their opinions, as proclaimed in their acts; and afterwards point out what we take to be the interests and the wishes of the nation, and the consequences which are likely

to follow from the establishment of Mehemet Ali at Constantinople. Not that we believe such an event possible ; but foreseeing in the supposed possibility, or advantages of such an event, a prolonged indecision on the part of England and France, or even a violent action on their part, which may not only abandon Turkey to Russia, but assist the accomplishment of the views of Russia by acts of these two powers as heretofore.

Mehemet Ali and the Sultan are both remarkable men ;—they are both endowed with great natural abilities ;—they are both above the prejudices of their age and country ;—they have both succeeded in extirpating the military oligarchies which oppressed Turkey and Egypt ;—and they have both neglected and despised, although not in the same degree, the fundamental and admirable principles of the administration they direct.

But the one had had numerous and immense advantages over the other. The destruction of the Mamelukes left the ground entirely free, for Mehemet Ali to plant as he pleased. In Turkey, the destruction of the Janissaries, however great and important an event, left erect and unbalanced the powerful administrative oligarchy, and the court, and the habits of a whole people. Mehemet Ali had a people of Fellahs to govern ; men accustomed for centuries to the grinding oppression of some thousand foreign adventurers, who took no part, and could take no part, in the change that had

been effected in their condition; who were unarmed, without chiefs, without a will, without property. Egypt was a country depending on a single river; that river was its high road, its sole road; it supplied irrigation for their fields, water for their flocks, drink for themselves; and this river could always be commanded by twenty gun boats. Mehemet Ali was not the governor, he was the proprietor of Egypt. No foreign complications—no foreign invasions—no internal revolts, disturbed his measures, exhausted his resources, or perplexed his councils; if he interfered elsewhere, it was his own doing; if he invaded Greece, it was at his own request. Mehemet Ali was born in indigence—nurtured in adversity—formed in the midst of long and arduous labours and struggles, he had early an opportunity of judging different men and different systems; he witnessed, at the commencement of his career, the struggle of England and France; he was early taught to appreciate the value of European discipline—the might of European power.

Mahmoud has enjoyed none of these advantages; nor are the talents of the creator of the splendid fortune of Mehemet Ali to be excepted in the accidental possessor of the Ottoman sceptre. Not the least of the difficulties Mahmoud has had to encounter has been his character of Sultan: taught to believe his power omnipotent, his rights irrefragable, every contest, instead of calling forth

his energies, exasperated his feelings. Still perhaps, the most remarkable point of the contrast between them is, that he who was born in the *purple* has evinced a personal simplicity and moderation to which the other is wholly a stranger.

How easy was it then to govern Egypt! no difficulty of any description whatever presented itself—no necessity for troops or fleets—no expenditure in any degree commensurate with the results; and what immense resources! Resources, which have furnished him five millions sterling yearly revenue, twenty-five times the largest tribute he has ever paid to the Porte. Is the man, who, after twenty years' tranquil possession of such a country, is unable to exist in it, fit to remodel such an empire as Turkey? Is the man who, as a subject, has displayed such inordinate ambition, fit to be trusted with the imperial diadem? Is the Pasha of Egypt, who, while his whole existence was exposed to the action of the maritime powers, and who even then has dared to defy them, and risks embroiling, or seeks to embroil, the whole of Europe, the fit person to place on the throne of Constantinople in such critical times? We should think not.

The Sultan, it is objected, is Russian. If he is so, it is the fault of England. We will not say that it is not in the nature of things that he should be Russian; but we say that facts prove the contrary. To whom did he apply for succour?

Was it not to England? Russian succour and Russian protection were forced upon him as a consequence of our refusal. His apparent connection with Russia is a proof of the degree to which we have deceived his hopes, betrayed his interests, and sacrificed our own. Is this to become the motive of fresh sacrifices?

But what assurances have we that Mehemet Ali is not Russian, notwithstanding all the trouble that is taken to make us believe the reverse?

We have no right to expect so much in the Sultan as we possess. If we choose to take the necessary measures for restoring the Ottoman empire, we shall find Mahmoud a docile and a willing instrument. Nothing can more fully prove this than his actual submissiveness to Russia, against his dignity, his interest, and his inclinations. No doubt it would be better if a great genius, without our aid or care, could arouse the latent energies of the Ottoman Empire, and relieve us from the trouble of defending it. But we have to take things as they are. Turkey, at present, is only to be supported by our means; and once the decision taken to support it, the only thing to be feared would be the refractory disposition of the chief.

During the reign of Mahmoud have been abolished the state and etiquette, which were formerly the all-absorbing occupation of the court

and capital—all the useless charges of the seraglio have been swept away. Is this little? An economy has been introduced into several departments of the state, which, all things considered, is really surprising. The power of life and death has been withdrawn from the Pashas;—the Christians have been relieved from those burthens and prohibitions that galled them before;—the number of Pashas greatly diminished;—the revenue, notwithstanding the deficiencies caused by the loss of the contributions of Greece, Albania, Wallachia, Moldavia; of Servia, for many years; of Egypt, Syria, Candia, Bagdat; lately of Akhalzick, Kars, and Erzroom; and, in consequence of the actual preparatives against Mehemet Ali of Sivas, Malatia, Marash, Chorum, and Diarbekir, that is, of one full half of the empire, is yet in a state to meet the increased demands of the new organization. Political culprits and rebels are not merely pardoned, but trusted according to their political capacity. The prisons of Constantinople are empty; there are no heads on the seraglio gate. These are facts: they do not cease to be so, because not known in Europe. The Empire has weathered these storms—has accomplished its internal reform, and the hands of the Government have been strengthened, and the independence of the people increased.

If the Sultan be reproached with want of the intelligence that Mehemet Ali has shown, in pre-

paring and organising a military force in proportion to his empire, we answer, that if Mahmoud had shown that intelligence, it is very probable that we should not now be recounting ameliorations that have taken place during his reign. Had he possessed a strong standing army, he might have attempted the same game as Mehemet Ali; and if he had, neither the character of Sultan, of Calif, or of Ottoman, could have saved him. His safeguard, and the negative cause of the ameliorations that have taken place, may be found in his military weakness.

His reign, since the destruction of the Janisseries, has been characterised, as before, with the most contemptible and ruinous foreign policy. But he has had the whole of Europe on his shoulders, and no European government could have stood under the ban of this political excommunication. But his internal administration has been characterised, as contrasted with former reigns, by economy, moderation, humanity, and administrative progress, gradual but real; the results of which would, ere this, had he been left in external repose, extorted the plaudits of Europe.

We do not say, we again repeat, that the strong mind of Mahmoud has worked these changes. Every amelioration has, in Europe, been attached to the individual. There is more dramatic effect in the personification, and little

is there suspected, the good there is in the Turkish institutions, and in the Turkish character. These beneficial changes coincided, no doubt, with the excellent natural dispositions of the Sultan; but, unassisted, he never would have had the nerve to put them in execution. What else do we want? When such a man unites in his person, to these qualities, and these useful weaknesses, the prescriptive rights of the oldest dynasty of Europe; is possessed of more extensive legal authority than any sovereign in Europe,—we may well rejoice, if we intend to save Turkey, to have such an instrument placed in our hands. But we must not, however, forget, that the very qualities that would make him useful to us, impose on us the necessity of using him; because, these qualities, if not utilised by us, will be utilised by Russia.

The Sultan's connection with Russia is his great sin in our eyes, and in the eyes of his people. Is not this the very result on which Russia calculated, in forcing on the Porte the Treaty of Protection? Are we going to stumble over the very block she has cast in our path? Are we, to the very last hour, to be the dupe of that Power?

But perhaps the cabinets are perplexed by the victories gained by Ibrahim over the Sultan.

The army of Mehemet Ali has become an object of predilection in Europe, because he has European officers in his service; because every traveller has obtained abundant information, of which he seeks

to make the most ; because a great nation has been duped into being his patron, and an able government finds him useful for its designs ;—hence, the prevailing opinion respecting Mehemet Ali, his government, his views, and his army. After thirty years' possession of one of the richest provinces in the world—after drawing from it fifty or sixty millions of pounds sterling—after his conquests and victories, all that the supposed civilizer of the East has to show, is some 60,000 disciplined Arabs, of doubtful fidelity ; and thirty men-of-war, of all sizes, of indifferent materials. Still his army is superior, or it was superior, to that of the Sultan ; because, in Egypt, the Pasha was the whole state ; because his whole attention was devoted to his troops ; and because he had learnt, in the struggles he so early witnessed between France and England, to appreciate the value of discipline. The superiority of his army consisted, however, in the superior officers ; but the arrogance of its chief after success, has struck at the root of that precarious superiority. It is in arrears ; the pay, such as it is, is reduced to the half of its nominal value, by the Pasha's monopolies and restrictions on commerce, which have at least doubled the price of all those objects which the officers and soldiers have to buy. Add to this, the demoralising effects of debauchery of every kind, a new and afflicting spectacle in

Turkey, which the troops of Ibrahim have transplanted from Egypt, its natural soil, to Damascus and Aleppo.

The march of Ibrahim through Anatolia—his conquest of Syria, require a word of explanation. In the East, there is a general disposition to submit to the appearance of strength; above all, to a disciplined army. Every town of Syria opened its gates to Ibrahim, and received him as a liberator. There, and in Anatolia, little or nothing had been positively done to ameliorate the state of the people; who did not, therefore, anticipate any beneficial change for themselves, while the governors, the Dere Beys that yet remained, and the little oligarchies, were well aware of the nature of the measures of the government. They saw their own destruction inevitable, and thus all parties united in seeking support from Ibrahim, the people looking for relief from their burthens, the chiefs for a balancing authority, which must weaken the Sultan's power. It is to be observed, that for the last twelve years the Ottoman empire had been engaged in continual wars at home and abroad, and in Turkey there is no financial tact, by which present burthens can be thrown on future generations.

This cause might alone suffice to explain the progress of Ibrahim, who, like so many rebel pashas, has overrun the provinces of the empire,

and displayed for a few years the internal signs of strength and power; but this is not the only cause of his success.

It is European politics which now control the destinies of Turkey. The hopes of the nation are placed without itself, so are its fears. It is from England and France that, from one extremity of the empire to the other, they look for support; it is from Russia they dread national subjugation. The public connection of the Sultan with Russia, exasperated therefore against him the whole people, and from this feeling naturally flowed the conviction that Ibrahim was supported by France and England, the antagonists of Russia; a conviction which every art was employed to confirm, and which in reality extorted from the Sultan, by the strength thus conferred on Ibrahim, the convention of Kutaiah.

But at all events it may be said the troops of the Sultan might have beaten the troops of Mehemet Ali. The Egyptians had first the superiority of direction and administration already indicated. Their progress was assisted by the intrigues of Russia and of others, which, acting on the indolent Porte, paralysed all its measures of defence. At length, however, after Acre had fallen, after Syria had been lost, after the passes of the Syrian and Cilician Thermopylæ had been occupied, the Porte did bestir itself. The Grand Vizier was recalled from Bosnia; he carried with

him a splendid army of thirty thousand Rumeliot mountaineers, besides some 10,000 regulars. The Sultan opened his treasures; immense stores of provisions were formed and dispatched, and the destruction of Ibrahim seemed inevitable. Such was the conviction of his perilous position, that on one occasion, on receiving a Tartar, just before the last decisive battle, Mehemet Ali tore his beard in despair, and exclaimed, "I have sacrificed my son!" Reschid Pasha miscalculated, was rash, engaged the enemy after a long and harassing march, in the middle of winter, and was beaten. These are the circumstances, as they appear from without, of that event, on which the opinion of Europe is formed on the relative strength of the Turkish and Egyptian armies. But we must raise the curtain; we must look on the secret springs, and not calculate the power of the machine by an unfair experiment, when the principal wheel was acting against the rest.

It is well known that the Seraskier Pasha has, for some time, been the first subject in Turkey. He was the chief of the body that replaced the Janissaries; he was the favourite and confidant of the Sultan. This double office soon gave him the control of every affair, and the nomination to almost every office in the state. He was the enemy of old of Mehemet Ali, therefore it might be supposed that all his power and influence would be exerted to overthrow his rival. No such thing!

Husref Pasha calculated, and calculated well, that the greater the power of Mehemet Ali, the greater would be the dependence of the Sultan on him ; but that if Hussein Pasha, or Reschid Pasha, triumphed over Ibrahim, the victorious general would return at the head of the victorious army, and the reward of his services would necessarily be the post of Seraskier. But it was not Husref Pasha alone who felt this position ; every individual connected with the administration felt it—all his creatures felt it. The result was the total betrayal, in the first instance, of Hussein Pasha. Provisions were sent him, but not so as to be available* ; artillery was sent him, *with empty ammunition waggons* ; troops were sent him, under officers who knew they would be sacrificed if he

* The Sultan drew from his private treasure 4000 purses, which were delivered to the Seraskier, to be forwarded to Hussein Pasha, for the express purpose of paying the peasantry for their cattle required for transport, and for those other services which are termed Angaria, or Corvée, and which have always been forced, and unremunerated, in Turkey until within the last few years. Various orders have been issued to put an end to this system ; but before it can cease, funds for the purpose must be provided ;—the destination of this money reflects, therefore, the highest credit on the Sultan. The sum never quitted Constantinople, but was divided by the Seraskier among his creatures, at his own palace. Hussein Pasha returning afterwards, beaten and unfortunate, ventured not to reveal the fact to his master.

succeeded ; and the governor of a district, through which he passed, seized and imprisoned by him for disobedience to orders, ventured to threaten him in the name of the Seraskier, and *was released*.

Reschid Pasha had at least troops true and devoted ;—he insisted, before quitting Constantinople, on abundant supplies of provisions ; as has been already stated, enough were supplied, it has been said, for his army for three years. But the Commissariat was under the direction of the Seraskier. Before the army had been a week marching, provisions began to fail, and arrived at Ak-Sher, their only chance of a supper was in the quarters of Ibrahim.

Reschid Pasha, before quitting Constantinople, had expressed, in the most energetic manner, to the Sultan himself, his perfect conviction, that by merely observing the enemy, by harassing him, cutting off his supplies, for which service his Albanians were the best troops in the world, Ibrahim could not possibly hold out six weeks ; that his army must surrender, or commence a retreat, which soon would be a flight :—that the Turkish hatred against the Arab would re-appear when they beheld him flying, so that not one of them would cross the Taurus. But the Sultan, inspired with confidence at the sight of the Albanians, and worked on by the Seraskier, would hear of no delay. The sudden dispersion of the provi-

sions soon awakened Reschid Mehemet to a sense of his danger. To this must be added the peremptory and perplexing orders he was daily receiving from Constantinople. Arrived within a few days' march of Ibrahim, he sent to expose the precariousness of his position, and the danger of pushing on in the midst of winter,—and of such a winter, in a country next to deserted, without provisions, without tents, clothing, or shoes. A man high in office was dispatched to the camp, with peremptory orders from the Sultan to attack on a fixed day, at whatever hazard, and under whatever circumstances. Reschid Pasha was exasperated to the highest degree ;—a decisive battle was fought, under every disadvantage, and, as all the world knows, lost, but not with dishonour.

Here are certainly grounds sufficient to account for the sacrifice of the finest army in the world. Indeed, the enduring activity and patience of the army of Reschid Pasha is beyond all praise. What might not be made of such materials, if properly handled ! If, under such circumstances, the victory of Ibrahim was purchased by the loss of a third of his troops, what must not the consequences have been, had they met on equal terms ? Of course, the result was certain, of a few weeks of observation. The part of Reschid was that of Fabius. He felt it too. But what avail brave arms, or able heads, when there is corruption

and ignorance in the high places of the state, and an able enemy at hand to counsel and betray?

But there is still another and a most important fact to be exposed; a damning fact, for the delusion or apathy which have so long offered up the complacent confidence of England and France on the altar of Russian ambition.

The Seraskier had chosen from all the army the best regiments, as a corps of reserve; they amounted to 25,000 men. They were stationed at Broussa, Izmit, and other places, so as to cover the capital. Reschid Pasha urged the necessity of placing this corps at his disposal, and insisted, at least, on its approach to the field of action, so as to obtain the weight of its moral support; so as to have it to fall back on, in case of check or disaster. He urged that, if he was beaten, there being no reserve behind him, his army was lost; and if his army was lost, what was the use of a reserve at Izmit? Constantinople could only be preserved by opinion, and such a defeat as his must be, if defeated, would open the capital to Ibrahim. That Ibrahim, even if victorious, would not be victorious without loss, and even victor he must be beaten, if to the first army immediately succeeded the reserve, composed, as it was, of the best troops. His arguments were, of course, irresistible; the Seraskier affected to hesitate, to consent, to retract, and probably must have yielded, when a new actor appeared on the scene.

Mouravieff had just arrived, the bearer of the good wishes of the Emperor, and of pressing offers of succour against the rebel; for the Emperor, besides his friendly regard for his ally, had duties to perform. It was his sacred duty to put an end to conflagration in his neighbour's house.

Mouravieff, of course, took the greatest interest in the disposition of the forces of the Sultan. "Where is your reserve?" he asked anxiously of the Seraskier, as if none of the dispositions were known to him. It did not require many arguments to convince the Seraskier that the reserve should not be entrusted to Reschid Pasha. "Reschid is a fool," said the Russian general; "he will sacrifice his army, and then where shall you be, unless you have your reserve at hand, to protect the capital? You, Seraskier, will be the first sacrificed by the Sultan, the populace, and the Egyptians." The Seraskier instantly conveyed to the Sultan the opinion of Mouravieff, and, strong in the military judgment of a distinguished officer, carried his point. Thus was the defeat of Conieh three-fold ensured; first, by the dispersion of the provisions, clothing, ammunition, and artillery; secondly, by compelling Reschid to act against his judgment, against the plainest at once, and the most cogent reasons; and, thirdly, by leaving in inaction, and removed from the scene of action, a considerable army, into

which army, thus thrown away, the best troops had been drafted*.

In this struggle every advantage, and advantages which can never return, were in favour of Mehemet Ali; every disadvantage, and disadvantages which no longer exist, against the Sultan. Mehemet Ali had a reputation throughout Turkey of great talents, of great power. The Turkish people, harassed by continual contributions and conscriptions, did not perceive that peace alone could bring them relief. Their immediate burthens induced them to look for improvement in every change, and for a happy change under the dominion (not, be it observed, the European sense of independent dominion) of a man whose reputation was so great. This delusion is gone. Wherever the government of Mehemet Ali has extended, he is known as a monopolist. Wherever the Arabs have encamped, we will not say animosity or hatred prevails against them, but disgust. The contributions levied—the violency of the soldiery in

* The best general in the Turkish army, after the Grand Vizier, was Tchiappan Oglou, Mehemet Pasha, formerly Pasha of Silistria. He has on many occasions proved himself a man of action, and of distinguished bravery. Not only has he lost his post, but he has lost his rank. He is now Mehemet Bey! We hardly think a comment necessary. But it is too absurd to look for any results, save those that Russia is working for, while she is allowed to work undisturbed. Let the tree be cut down, if you like, but say at least that it is the axe that fells it.

Anatolia, their presence and retreat, have destroyed the idea that Ibrahim was a liberator; and the debauchery, and still more the habitual indecency of the Arabs, have revolted the Turks, the most sensitively decorous and decent of all people.

But the causes of the Sultan's weakness in Anatolia existed in a ten-fold degree for Mehemet Ali in Egypt. The populations of Anatolia suffered Ibrahim to pass: but where did they join his standard? They suffered him to pass, first, in consequence of present discontent; secondly, because they were led to believe that he was supported by England and France; and that he was marching, under a secret intelligence with the Sultan, against Russia. This belief was universal in Anatolia. But had a few thousands of the Sultan's troops landed on the Delta, there seems not to be a doubt that from that hour the power of Mehemet Ali was blasted at the root. The standard of the Sultan would have been joined by the people *en masse*, and by the troops. The Pasha would have fallen without a blow; nor would there have remained to him a devoted party—a blood-connected tribe—a fastness—or a mountain, to prolong the struggle or to break his fall.

Mehemet Ali has, therefore, lost the prop of opinion; the Sultan has gained what Mehemet Ali has lost. Mehemet Ali had all Syria for him; now the Sultan has all Syria for him. Since the contest, the army of Mehemet Ali

has sunk, that of the Sultan has somewhat improved, although lamentably inefficient, and unworthy. The Fellahs are nothing without discipline, and pay is in arrears, and the officers are disgusted. The desertions are not from the vanquished to the victorious army, but from the Egyptian to the Turkish*. Yet the officers in Egypt have double and triple the pay of the officers in the Turkish service; this itself is an important test : and as to their material state, the

* In speaking of the deserters from Egypt, we cannot help offering a passing tribute to the memory of Osman Pasha. He occupied the first position in Egypt; he owed every thing to the Pasha, yet he sacrificed both his position and his affection, not certainly in the hope of greater distinction at Constantinople; he knew too well the corruption that reigned in the superior administration; he knew too well that the Argus eyes, and the Briareus arms of Russia, would watch and thwart him, if his position rendered him an object of jealousy, by the possibility of doing good. But Osman Pasha was a man guided by profound views, and superior motives. He said, on his death-bed, to those around him, " I speak not to you of my motives, none of you can comprehend them; but the day will come, when Turks will comprehend them." To render his ideas in the shortest compass, Osman Pasha believed that the unity of power, and the supremacy of the Sultan, were the necessary guarantees of the Turkish constitution. He believed that the power of Mehemet Ali (independent entirely of his errors or merits) was incompatible with the existence of Turkey; and that his errors and ambition would actively conduce to the furtherance of the designs of Russia. The life of this man might have served the state more than ten victories.

Turkish troops are paid with the strictest punctuality; they are well fed, which the Egyptians are not; clothed, if not well, at least better than the Egyptians.

The Sultan may lose again two armies of irregulars, or even all his regular troops, and (were Russia neutralised) not be in a much worse position than to-day. A single defeat, one retrograde movement, is fatal to Mehemet Ali.

But the Sultan has against him his now official and solemn connection with Russia. This connection puts in hazard, not only his character of Sultan, but of Mussulman. The demoralising influence of Russia is still more predominant than ever in the councils of Turkey. Husreff Pasha is still Seraskier. Reschid Pasha again commands the armies of the Sultan. Will he not be again sacrificed? Will the troops fight against a man proclaimed, by all the agency Russia has at her command, to be the enemy of Russia, and the ally of England and France—for a man, who, though Sultan, is the protégée of Russia? There are many chances, therefore, open, and foreign intelligence and agency will necessarily decide the contest on the Turkish arena; where, alas! all is blindness on one side, and sharp-sightedness on the other.

The affairs of Europe resemble a game of chess, where every move has been made that it was possible to make, without exchange or retreat.

An exchange is at length to take place in this corner. The pieces are insignificant ; but on the result hinges the chance of the game. On that game, conducted in chief by Russia on one side, and interesting, though not regarded by England and France on the other, is irrevocably staked all that great nations can contend for.

We conclude, therefore, that Mehemet Ali, notwithstanding his undoubted and superior talents—his success in the culture of cotton—his success in raising a large revenue—his success in concentrating the fortunes of Egypt in himself—his success in forming an army of Fellahs, and in creating a fleet in Egypt, is one of the least fitted men that can be supposed for governing at this moment the Ottoman empire. We come to this conclusion, from the precarious condition to which his own power is actually reduced in the midst of these exuberant countries ; in the midst of a docile and prostrate population, and after the most brilliant successes. We come to it from his faults, his ambition, wilfulness, insatiable covetousness ; but above all, from his ideas of administration—his principles of fiscality, which would not be suffered in Turkey one month. We come to this conclusion from his very successes. It may be said that he will change ; but the success he has had in Egypt in enforcing his will has not been the best school of moderation. The man who has dared so much as a subject, cannot be expected not to

dare more as a sovereign. In Turkey, the sovereign *has now no check whatever*, save dread of consequences, the traditional organ of which has disappeared.

We likewise conclude that Mahmoud, notwithstanding his avarice, which disappears when compared with that of Mehemet Ali—notwithstanding his weakness of purpose—notwithstanding that he has not succeeded better in concerting a great and overwhelming reform—notwithstanding his too-confiding disposition, and want of confidence in himself—notwithstanding his excess of contempt for the prejudices, his want of respect for the institutions of his country, his excessive desire of imitating Europe—notwithstanding, in fine, his obliged submissiveness to Russia, still is a fit instrument, if properly used; and we rejoice in having at this moment such a man on the throne of Constantinople.

We here rest the comparison of the personal qualifications of Mehemet Ali and Mahmoud, for governing, without convulsion, the Ottoman Empire, on the merits of Mehemet Ali, and on the demerits of the Sultan. If any diligent examiner, after comparing the nature of the successes, where he has succeeded, of Mehemet Ali, and of the failures of Mahmoud, where he has failed, does not come to the same conclusion, we at once confess that we have wholly mistaken the question.

Here it is impossible not to signalize one of the

thousand fallacies that encumber this question. People talk of the opinion of "impartial observers," respecting Mehemet Ali or the Sultan; the expression implies the same distance from the comprehension of Eastern institutions, or the internal or external politics of Turkey, that, speaking of "impartial" views of a crystal, would imply ignorance of the science of mineralogy. But unfortunately this great political science has to be at once discovered, and studied. The principles of that great society, so distinct from our own, may not be appreciated before its political existence has passed away, nor the designs of Russia appreciated until they are realized; and both are conditions necessary to their accomplishment. The policy of Russia is the fable of the sphynx; its riddle read, its spell is broken, and its power and life extinct; but until then, let Bœotia beware!

In all countries under the sun, taxation is a disagreeable thing—heavy burthens, oppressive—and present suffering, productive of present discontent. Turkey is subject to the common law, but there is this singular in her state, that having produced the causes of discontent, we are about to punish her for the consequences, although certainly no state in Europe, exposed to the same system of propagandism, of perpetual menace, and of political excommunication, could have opposed to these solvants a patient endurance, and a simplicity and singleness of opinion, such as she has

done. The whole of Christendom has been leagued against her at a moment of internal change—revolt has succeeded to revolt—war to war; and here all the evils of war accompany it, without any of its European allurements or excitement; and these evils fall directly on man, with unmitigated, unequallised severity.

Let us suppose Austria,—which, like Turkey, is an assemblage of many races, and many creeds—let us suppose Austria, one of the first powers in Europe, exposed to this system of propagandism—let us suppose her deprived of her foreign diplomatic influence, and standing alone, opposed to a powerful enemy, who prepares events, seeks opportunities, distracts the opinion, or embarrasses the counsels of all other states; and thus not only finds treacherous moments, and modes of striking, but uses the weapons of other powers to that end; nor is this all, but represents the successes so obtained in such a manner, as to make herself appear all strength, her enemy all weakness. Under such circumstances, how many months would Austria hold together? Our argument goes merely to prove, that the material strength, and internal cohesion of Turkey, is immensely greater than we can have any conception of, judging by European tests and notions. The political circumstances of Turkey, during the last twenty years, would have sufficed to break to pieces twenty centralised European governments.

We have, therefore, to wonder at the fact of her existence; not at the existence of evils, which, however great in their immediate effect, have not yet become so domesticated, as to *produce difference of political opinion*. The importance, or bearing, of this observation, we do not expect to be appreciated, until the subject itself, and the principles of eastern administration, have been handled in a very different manner than has hitherto been attempted.

The Sultan, involved in a continuous struggle for self-existence, has been an oppressor, not as Mehemet Ali, by system and election, but of necessity. His oppression, destitute of intelligence on one hand, has on the other wanted the energy and combination of calculated despotism. It was, therefore, unproductive of force corresponding with its severity. Hence, new necessities and new oppression, disproportionate to the cause and result, and a discontent (for Turkey) disproportionate to both.

But this oppression, and this discontent, compared with the state of Egypt, need scarcely be named as evils, so trifling are they in the contrast, so disproportionate are the existing causes; for the Turk, and even the tributary races, are accustomed to an independence, and to a freedom of individual action, which, it is needless to say, is wholly incompatible with the systematic oppression of the Pasha of Egypt, but which could not

co-exist with those European institutions which are supposed to confer and ensure the largest portion of political liberty.

It has often occurred to us to be asked by Turks, why England and France did not place Mehemet Ali on the throne of Constantinople. And how many Europeans have been deceived by such expressions! It has never occurred to us to state to Turks, professing such opinions, the views we have here advocated, without bringing them, without exception, and with readiness, to admit their truth, and to feel that (excepting always foreign policy) the errors of the Sultan were errors of omission—those of Mehemet Ali, of commission; that the principal evils of Turkey flowed from circumstances for the most part external; that the removal of the dynasty of Othman would increase, not alleviate, those evils; and, in fine, if the Sultan was found untractable, and England and France decided on removing him, in the spirit of conservation, that they must look out for some fitter man than Mehemet Ali to supply his place.

But, however our opinions may be strengthened by such personal experience, we have no need of insulated facts to establish truths, which whole cities, and entire populations, have proclaimed aloud. Syria has asserted its change of mind. Anatolia, wherever the Arabs have appeared, has had its eyes opened. Even in the capital, where

so many just as unjust causes of complaint exist, has not the Pasha almost entirely lost the large faction he could dispose of a few months ago?

But all along, Mehemet Ali has found it necessary to call in aid of a surreptitious nature. He has made the most of a popular foreign influence, unparalleled in the history of any people, and more particularly remarkable among the Turks. His partisans and agents have always put forward, as his principal claim to public support, his connection with France, and his supposed connection with England, as these two countries are always mentioned together throughout the East. Russia, as may well be supposed, has not neglected such a lever. Her agents have industriously spread the mischievous opinion, which there was no agent of England to learn or contradict, and which was not certainly contradicted by those of France*.

* For instance, the first Dragoman of France, in an assembly of some of the most distinguished persons at Constantinople, after expatiating on the abuses of the Government, the faults of the Sultan, and his connection with Russia, added, "Therefore, France and England turn to Mehemet Ali, as "the only hope of salvation for the empire." Such words as these make themselves wings; the effect is incalculable. Here is no Russian suggestion. Here is a confession from the mouth of the French mission. So the Turks would understand it; so they did understand it. It may be added to this (though the nominally French Dragoman might have motives

If this notion is serviceable to Russia, in Turkey, of what importance is it not to her in Europe? In its use, have we not put our finger on its real source? Mehemet Ali is supported in Turkey, because the Turks are made to believe that he is befriended by England and France, who are the enemies of Russia. In England, and particularly in France (we speak not of the Government), the conviction of the necessity of supporting the Sultan, and in him the Empire, is paralysed, because people are made to believe that the Turks prefer Mehemet Ali to the Sultan. Really the drama is worth carrying on for the entertainment of the Emperor, if Russia had no interest at all in the question. Russia's policy, however masterly it appears, when judged by the immense results hitherto obtained, has a ruder ordeal to undergo, before its claim to such high distinction can be admitted. Hitherto the strength of the antagonists has not been matched; knowledge was all on one side, ignorance on the other; intent design against perfect indifference; the impetus of movement against the immense endurance of a great power in a state of rest. How easy would it not have been, a hundred times during the last ten independent of the policy of France), that Admiral De Rigny, when he commanded on the Levant station, seemed to have *not less* at heart to discredit the Sultan, than to aggrandise Mehemet Ali.

years, to have frustrated the designs of Russia! Now that she has conquered at length our indifference, we will see if the combinations that have appeared so dexterous, and have been so fortunate, will preserve their fortune, and if the designs of Russia can prosper, under the gaze of the awakened eye of England.

We have thus far argued the question between Mehemet Ali and Mahmoud, as between two private individuals; as between competitors with equal pretensions and equal rights, whose personal qualifications alone were to decide on their nomination. But, as our object in choosing between them, is solely for the benefit of the Ottoman nation, we must be prepared to sacrifice our own opinions and predilections, should these be opposed to the wishes, habits, or prejudices of that nation. We must, therefore, seek to anticipate the feelings, as the Mussulman would, *after* the establishment of Mehemet Ali Pasha, in the room of Mahmoud Padishah; Khan, the son of Khans, in direct descent from the great founder of the dynasty; Calif, the successor of the Califs; Turk, the chief of the Turkish race, and more particularly head of the family or class of Osmanles, whose distinction is drawn from the supremacy of the line of Othman.

Whoever has opened the history of the Ottoman empire, must have been struck by the fact of the supremacy of a single family through thirty generations, and during six centuries. We will not

venture to trace the cause of this fact, but we may be permitted to infer from it, first, the great probability (to us the certainty) of breaking up the empire by displacing this family; and secondly, the deep demoralization that must ensue from destroying throughout a whole people, a principle which is not only their sole political bond, but which is so interwoven with their habits, their feelings of duty and religion, that it cannot be separated from them. In this country there are no codes of written laws. Man's social rights, and his political constitution, are defined and preserved by a few but simple and inestimable convictions, deeply engraven on every man's bosom. Teach them, or force them, to throw aside the respect which to you appears solely political, and you insult all that renders them individually estimable, you endanger all respect whatever; so that, in the furtherance of what you are led to believe to be a design for uniting them against a foreign foe, you destroy that bond of union, and you weaken, if you do not entirely destroy, the peaceful habits of submission, without which there would be no government in Turkey to work upon.

During six centuries the line of Othman has reigned *without the support of any of those institutions which are supposed with us to be the sole props of a dynasty or a throne*. It has had no standing army—no aristocracy—no centralised administration. Those who think that they can

sufficiently account for a fact like this, by supposing the Turks, as Turks, born to submit to a Sultan, and the Sultan sacred and supreme, because successor of the prophet, would do well to think of becoming acquainted with the institutions and habits of a country so totally different from Europe, before presuming to decide on its fate and interests.

Two causes have of late years tended to lower the character of the Sultan.

The first, the absolutism which the Sultan has achieved; since there exists no longer any combination, or any influence which can controul him or depose him, the safeguard of the throne has been the facility of deposing the Sultan*. This new power of the Sultan is beneficial, or the reverse, according to its use.

The second, the protectorate of the present Sultan by the enemy of the Mussulman faith and dominion.

These causes re-act powerfully on each other, under the influence of Russia, to hasten the effect of the “destructive principle†.”

How easily may both be rendered innoxious, by taking the Sultan under our tutelage, guarding him from his own errors, relieving him from the

* Suleyman granted to the Janissaries a bounty on the accession of each new sovereign, with the express view of predisposing them to depose any Sultan who excited popular discontent.—See *Cantmier's Life of Suleyman*.

† See *Berlin Gazette*, 12th Sept. 1834.

superintendence of Russia, and thus doubly restoring him to his people's affections.

The Sultan is the key-stone of an arch which exists not by him, but which cannot stand without him. He is the centre of a great system, which has conciliated the interests apparently so discordant, according to European notions of interests, of this vast empire, ever since its creation; which has established habits to govern and sustain its action; which reposes on long traditions of submission; which has many and great abuses, but which has exhibited an immense power of self regeneration. This last consideration, which ought to give it favour in our eyes, is precisely the cause of our actual doubts, and of its weakness; for before there was sufficient time for the effervescence to subside, for the results to appear, for the experiments to be made, an artful and watchful enemy attacked it; seized the moment when the Ottoman nation was disarmed and in doubt, to throw its armies upon it, having succeeded at the same moment in producing internal revolt, and in detaching from it those powers which ought to have flung at all times their shield before it, and more especially at the moment that so great and important a change was in progress. These appear to us imperative reasons for supporting Turkey as an independent state, without reference to the danger, for ourselves, of its annexation to Russia. It can only be supported by supporting its chief and its government. It would be a

strange infatuation, either to think of supporting it by the destruction of both, or to compromise their existence by hesitation as to what policy is to be pursued in a contingency which certainly ought not to take us by surprise.

We have weighed Mehemet Ali against Mahmoud; now we must weigh the Pasha of Egypt against the Sultan; but what balance is there between the two. Is not the very power of Mehemet Ali the result of a state of indecision in the central Government, which must become dissolution if he were at the head of it? The prejudices, prescriptive rights, habits of submission, vanish, the very moment that Mehemet Ali succeeds to the Sultan, for these all centre in his person. Mehemet Ali is, moreover, an old man—his son is not certainly to be looked to as a peaceable successor*. England has nothing to reckon on, save the personal ability of a man of sixty-five. Her whole scheme is frustrated by a diarrhoea or a quinsey. What guarantee of duration, of stability, can be imagined to support a decision, or an indecision, which may lead to such a result, through the destruction of the system that has so long existed; that exists to-day, and which contains the germs of future and prosperous existence.

Had Mehemet Ali been the most able admi-

* Ibrahim has one pre-eminent quality, submission to his father's superior judgment; his merit is, being the best General in Turkey. Deprived of his father, and withdrawn from the camp, he remains with his vices alone.

nistrator that ever appeared in Turkey—had he comprehended the principles of the constitution of Turkey—had he made himself the idol of those populations which are subject to his authority, then should we consider his merits as the greatest of misfortunes, if they gained for him at such a crisis such golden opinions in Europe as to make him the champion of the allies against the Sultan; for even then, the destructive principle which would have raised him to the throne, would have dissolved the empire; every Pasha would have looked on him as an equal; the causes of actual discontent, which proceed from political circumstances, would not have been altered, and the unity of the empire would have been lost. Which of the various tribes would have adhered to their allegiance? Which of the burthens of the state would have been relieved? Which of the provisions of the treaties of Jassi, Bucharest, Ackerman, Adrianople, Unkiar Skelessi, or St. Petersburg, would have been abrogated? But such as he is, having failed, whether by his own system or the personal violence of his supposed successor Ibrahim—having lost Greece to the empire*—having disgusted the populations of every province he has acquired—having lost the good

* There cannot be a doubt that the independence of Greece is owing to the energy that flowed from the hatred with which Ibrahim had inspired them.

name which, won so unjustly, has served him so well;—the supposition, to-day, of his succeeding to the sway of the Sultan, is but the dream of an impossibility.

However, there is still a notion more absurd, if possible, than this, and that is the hope of reconciling the two, the idea of strengthening the empire by dividing it into two hostile posts, the policy, if such a name it deserves, of prolonging that hostility by postponing an inevitable struggle, of employing the forces of the allies in the cause of Russia, in maintaining forcibly this exhausting opposition—is a policy even more fatal than taking up Mehemet Ali, and destroying the Sultan, to put him in his place; because, at least, *then* England and France would act, and their taking a false measure, which their power may carry through, and which places them in opposition to Russia, whilst that opposition is easy, is certainly preferable to the inaction that inevitably sacrifices Turkey, and allows Russia all she wants—time.

If England and France doubt their own intelligence on this question, they may adopt a very safe test by which to try the value of their policy; they may be sure when they are right, and that is when they are opposed to Russia; they know what her interests are—they know that she alone understands the question. They have seen the fruits of acting with her—her support, her vigorous

support of Mehemet Ali—her resistance to the rupture between him and the Sultan, might alone, we think, have sufficed to open their eyes. Their position in 1821 and 1827, might have been sufficient warning against the strange coincidence that marks their policy at this very hour.

There may be, however, an immediate necessity for this—we are far from denying it; but if we cannot venture on taking the field against Russia on any of the details of the question, are we not placed in a most lamentable predicament? It is clear our position must continue to grow worse and worse; advantages will be sacrificed day by day—the power of resistance in Turkey will daily disappear—men's minds, and men's opinions, will become more and more unsettled—so that even if a collision is prevented, if no great catastrophe intervenes, even then you will permit the people to be demoralized. Then how will you support the empire? A word, a will, suffices at present; in a short time hence millions may be squandered, and tens of thousands of lives sacrificed in vain; for to talk of peace, is but an avowal of entire ignorance of the question; while we continue to avow our dread of war, things will go on as before; but the descent has become more rapid.

We presume not to say what ought to be done; but this we say, with fullest conviction, that all we can do will be unavailing, until we meet and curb Russia. Mehemet Ali is the mere instrument—even if you prevent this one from being the suc-

cessful instrument of her designs, another Mehemet Ali will arise. Destroy the Seraskier, another Seganus will be found. Our best expedient can only postpone the consummation, but not change our position, and very soon the material strength of Russia will enable her to cast aside these expedients. She will very soon drop the wizzard's mask, and spectre winding sheet, and step in in real arms, and with corporeal strength.

But there seems little doubt that the English cabinet is aware of the necessity of acting, and is only restrained by the doubts of France. It is strange that the union of principles and interests, and the strict alliance of the two first nations, which each alone might defy the whole world, should, by doubling the real strength of each, render infirm the purpose of both. It is strange that the apathy of France should paralyze the intentions of England on a question, which to her is a question of existence.

England has no territorial invasion to fear from Russia, even possessed of all the consequences of her conquest, save as a remote contingency. England has possessions to lose—maritime supremacy to lose—commercial prosperity to lose—God knows, enough to think of and to fight for; but she has no invasion to dread—*France has*. France cannot be at rest a moment after the occupation of the Dardanelles—*England may*, at least until France is subdued. The first, the most imperative necessity in this question belongs to France. How

is it then that she is not overjoyed to see England put herself forward? How is it, on the contrary, that she restrains England?

We believe, in the first place, that the subject is very little understood at Paris; and, secondly, that the Russian diplomatists are much abler men than those in France, with whom the decision rests. Nor can we help thinking that the French cabinet listens to delusive oracles.

There are two men who, in the general ignorance, have influenced more especially the eastern question, and these are General Sebastiani, and Admiral de Rigny. We affirm that the connection of each with the East, and their respective positions there, tend to detract from the presupposeable correctness of their judgment. And believing that they both have not only false opinions, but views which we shall not characterise, the information they possess renders them doubly dangerous; and considering their eminent position, and their monopoly of this question, we cannot omit an indication at least of the motives that must influence them.

Sebastiani has seen Constantinople under other circumstances. We have often remarked that an old Turk may change, because his ideas are simple; but a Frank, who has been accustomed to the old Turkish system, is unchangeable, and incapable of comprehending the changes that take place before his eyes. Sebastiani has proclaimed Turkey a

corpse ; he is not the man to see in Turkey elements of resistance against Russia ; and the having committed himself to such an opinion may not incline him to receive new and favourable impressions. Very soon, the veil of mystery that has rendered the East and the West reciprocally invisible to each other, will be drawn aside ; diplomatic relations are now established between Turkey and Europe—many young Turks have commenced the study of European languages—many of the fallacies and errors, respecting men and things, must soon cease—many a hitherto reputed oracle will be desecrated—many a reputation blasted. It may, therefore, be prudent henceforth, for those who have motives to conceal, not to provoke exposure by perseverance in hostility, of which it would become necessary, in justice to the question itself, to expose the motives.

But the connection of the present minister of foreign affairs with that country, is far more important. If, as we have stated, the strength of Russia in Turkey is actually acquired by the position of Mehemet Ali, if the decision of France, and, through her, England is paralysed by the desire of preserving the Pasha of Egypt, or of placing him on the throne of Constantinople, can France be expected to take on this question the only part that can extricate both from their difficulties—that of supporting the Sultan—while the minister for foreign affairs is not only the

man who has been the principal architect of the fortune of Mehemet Ali, but who is chiefly indebted for his own elevation to that connection.

POSTSCRIPT.

Since the foregoing pages were written, an important event has occurred; Mehemet Ali has endeavoured to obtain the sanction of England, France, and Austria, to the declaration of his independence. He has put forth, in an official note, addressed to these cabinets, the difficulties he laboured under from the pretensions and enmity of the Porte, and proposes, if the Powers will sanction his independence, to devote his whole attention to the collection of large military resources (150,000 men), to hold at the disposal of these powers for opposing Russia! This singular attempt is absurd, now that it has been met; but it would have been most able had it succeeded. The object of this note might have been to ensnare the adhesion of England, and, failing this, to establish still more firmly the apparent connection between Mehemet Ali and France and England—fill the mind of the Sultan with distrust of these powers, and confirm, beyond all reconciliation, the feud between them. Had not the English cabinet been more enlightened than it ever had been before, the design would have been successful, and its success would have been the finishing stroke for

Turkey. Happily the English minister viewed this attempt in its true light; answered Mehemet Ali, that the countenance of such a design would be contrary alike to the principles and the interests of England, and advised him, if he wished to preserve the friendship of England, to desist from using the power delegated to him against his sovereign, and to evacuate Orfa, and pay his tribute.

Equally happy was the mode in which this communication was made to the Porte by the English ambassador. While the French representative communicated *confidentially to the dragoman*, the answer of his Government to Mehemet Ali, as some petty affair might be communicated; Lord Ponsonby transmitted the answer of England in a public note. Thus, for the first time, were the wiles of Russia turned against herself. The means she had imagined, and which, judging by the past, she had reason to deem sufficient, for embroiling the Sultan with England, and for widening the breach between him and his vassal, led to the unequivocal declaration of the desire of England for the consolidation of the Sultan's power,—exposed the falsehood she had so long laboured to accredit, of the connection between England and Mehemet Ali,—caused the evacuation of Orfa,—gave England a first-taste of the power she does possess, when prepared to use it judiciously,—and excited a feeling of indignation against Russia among

the Turks, who, right or wrong, attributed this step of Mehemet Ali's to her machinations.

It is a singular thing that this note, manifestly directed against Russia, should have been communicated to Austria. It is no less singular that Austria communicated it to the Porte, that, too, in exaggerated terms, and spoke of an Arab empire, to which no allusion is made in the note. Who can solve this enigma? Austria has long been in the habit of being every thing to every body; but here she is at once for every body, and against every body; but she actually puts herself forward as a moderator, and makes offers of mediation. Prince Metternich may, no doubt, arrive at a point in his scale of alarms, where his fear of Russia overbalances his fears of France, especially if the government of France descends from its natural position. But it appears to us that England has nothing to do with such complications. Her policy is clear; her power, if exerted now, sufficient to carry with her, of necessity, those who would fain be moderators and directors of European policy. Austria may naturally desire such support, in certain opposition to Russia, as may make her a little respectable in the eyes of the Emperor. She may dread the encroachments of Russia; but she must dread much more the re-organization and the prosperity of Turkey. She must be, therefore, a decided and well-informed enemy to that which must be the

object of the policy of England, from the moment that England *has reasoned to a conclusion on the affairs of Turkey.*

Foiled in this attempt, a second was made, through the agency of Turkey itself, which readily grasped at the proposition, that England should take Mehemet Ali's fleet from him, and deliver it to the Sultan. If a threat of England had made Mehemet Ali evacuate Orfa, it was clear that he was at the mercy of England, and that England began to feel that he was so. Why was he so? merely because he did possess a fleet. The possession of this fleet, therefore, while it exhausted his resources, controlled his operations on land, and rendered him subservient to England; by depriving him of the fleet, his finances were relieved, his continental position doubly strengthened, and he was withdrawn from dependence on England; he would also have been deprived of the power, on any contingency, of upsetting the Sultan by a *coup de main*; and so many more vessels would have been placed in the arsenal of Constantinople, at the disposal of the Emperor. And this was all to have been done by England herself; and in doing so, she was to be persuaded that she had settled the question of Mehemet Ali, and of Turkey. What must Russia's opinion be of the sagacity of England! What must not the physical weakness be—what *is* not the physical weakness of a government that has owed, and daily owes, its

power and progress to such facilities for deception, and such practice in deceiving ! What would the disgraceful exposure be, if her now panic-struck antagonist ventured to lay his iron hand on her gorgon mask, and lion's skin !

In a word, Mehemet Ali is a rebel to his sovereign—a tyrant to his people—a traitor to his faith, his race, and country ; and exists, on the one hand, because he is the tool of two foreign powers ; and on the other, because he has a people too docile to exasperate, and a country too exuberant to exhaust. Mehemet Ali has accomplished the policy begun by Joseph ; he has made his own, the lands—the trees—the cattle—and the men, of Egypt ; but he has left no store for the evil days. Egypt must be, from physical causes, a land of unmitigated oppression ; to it foreign dominion has been, at all times, a blessing, because so alone could any controlling authority exist for its ruler ; therefore, too, the proverb of old, which again may prove true, “ Egypt is a broken reed.”

Up to the autumn of last year, Russia seems not to have dreamt of the possibility of being attacked in the Black Sea ; she seems to have remained confident of the indifference of Europe, and of the sufficiency of the means she actually possessed for the realization of her designs. At that period a new light seems to have broken upon her ; she suddenly

contracted for the construction of twenty-five line-of-battle ships, and thirty-five of smaller sizes, and commenced extensive works at Sevastopol, which had but the character of strength. These facts require no comment. These vessels must be designed to issue from the Straits she has ordered to be closed against us. These works of defence can be of service but to resist retaliation for what she is preparing to inflict. Circumstanced as Russia financially is, such an expenditure, at this moment, proves that no time is to be lost.

In conjunction with these facts, we have others no less important. The treaty of the 8th of July is now clearly established to be an offensive treaty against England, and an abrogation of the treaty between England and Turkey of 1809.

During the last year, the influence of England at Constantinople has been maintained by the hope and belief that England would be forced to take steps to annul the treaty of the 8th of July—restrain Russia, and re-organise Turkey. This conviction was universal, because all these things appeared easy, connected, necessary, and inseparable from the evident interests of England; and, however England might have sacrificed Turkey before, it was now hoped that a new era in our policy had arrived. The Turks judge of the nation by its representative, and, at a moment when, under the ordinary routine, our diplomatic relations with Turkey would have been inter-

rupted, and our representative must have retired, not only have those relations been kept up, but an influence obtained over the counsels of the Government, and over the minds of the Turks, unparalleled at any previous period. This result, though brought about by the efforts of the distinguished nobleman, whom statesman-like views, political sagacity, and courtly manners, most particularly fit to represent England as she ought to be represented, among such a people as the Turks, is still contingent, on the decision of England, to do that which is pointed out as her part, by the hopes of all the countries that feel or fear the Russian power.

To this hope was added the confidence inspired throughout the East by the union of France and England.

The importance of this union cannot be better proved, than by the pains taken by Russia to disprove it. Her constant theme was—England, and France distracted by faction at home, and disunited abroad. “France,” said she, “is with *us*”—“HER KING is with *us*.” But these assertions were in manifest contradiction with the conduct of Admiral Roussin, who sedulously marked, on every occasion, his entire approbation of the course taken by Lord Ponsonby. It may here be remarked, that two successive ambassadors of France have pursued at Constantinople, without the sanction, it would appear, of the government at home—the policy

dictated by the true interests of France. But Russia found means to neutralise the effect of this happy and most beneficial union. An envoy of France, sent to Mehemet Ali, a partisan of the restoration and of Russia, and who had been under secretary of state under Polignac, is brought to Constantinople, where he is recommended to the Porte by the Austrian Minister* as the real representative of the views of the French Cabinet and King, and takes every opportunity of expressing his disapproval of the ambassador's conduct, and his conviction of the necessity of an intimate union between France and Russia, which, it was whispered, he was instrumental in bringing about. But

* Nearly the whole of the diplomatic agency of Europe at Constantinople, is at the disposal of Russia. The power thus given her is incalculable. It is by telling stories that Russia principally assumes a position that the Turks are bullied into submitting to. Of what importance then is it to have so many mouths to tell them, and to prevent any from contradicting them? The Missions of Austria, Prussia, Holland, Sardinia, and Naples, have hitherto been as subservient as if they received her pay. France has been acting in both senses. The Dragomans of course look to the paying power. The salary of the Dragoman of France would not maintain him respectably in the station he occupies. Sweden and Denmark, Russia's old arch-antagonists, are here at the vital point for their interests, and perhaps independence, represented by Frank inhabitants of Pera. The English Dragoman is an honourable man, but might be more esteemed by the Turks if he happened not to be brother to the Dragoman of Russia!

it is superfluous to speak of the importance to Russia of a union with France, or of the facilities she possesses for forming such a union. A union with the Government of France gives her time for shutting up the Dardanelles, she thus becomes an over-match for France, while the very fact of that union arouses the vengeance of France against its Government, and throws that distracted country again into civil war.

We believe that had England acted while she was, to her own perfect conviction, certain of carrying France along with her, that all these dangers would have been avoided. Already, perhaps, the disunion between France and England, which Russia was so anxious to have believed in the East, has been realised in the West. If so, action is necessary, to solve this new complication, even if Turkey presented only a field on which a decision of England would bring the Government of France forcedly to her side. In fact, whatever European complication you undertake to unravel, or trace out, will lead you to the Dardanelles, as *cause and solution*; and this is natural—not because it really is the most important geographical and military and political position in the world, but because its possession, and that speedily, is A NECESSITY OF EXISTENCE to the ablest Government in Europe, whose agents listen, whisper, reason, bully, pay, bribe, cozen, flatter, menace, in every club, assembly, court, and press, in Europe

—who assume the colours of Legitimist, Republican, Carlist, Pedrist, Jesuit, Protestant, Orangeman, White-Boy, Tory, Radical—all and every thing; so that Europe may be controlled and occupied until she take her seat, and look around from Constantinople.

There is but one way of solving these complications, of uniting France to us—of detaching Austria and Prussia from Russia—of restoring Poland—of solving the Egyptian question—of maintaining the independence of Greece, which we have effected—of preserving the rights of Samos, we have guaranteed (so levelled are all questions before this, which affects alike a parish and an empire)—of saving Turkey—of maintaining the *de facto* independence of the Circassians—of defending Persia—of securing India—of preventing another irruption of Northern Barbarians—and that is the presence of England, by her pendants and her guns, on that portion of her own element, from which Russia has ventured too soon, let us hope, to pronounce her exclusion.

If the Government of France has gone over to the natural and necessary enemy of France, the necessity for England to act is more imperative, if possible, than before. Before, the fact of the union of France and England imposed a respect on Russia that no longer exists; France becomes, like Austria, a mere cat's-paw, to ensnare the confidence of England; to keep Russia informed

of her decisions, or her non-decisions ; and what more can Russia desire, than to be assured that her designs are not perceived. But let not England for an instant conceive that the solution of the eastern question is rendered less certain or more difficult by the apostacy of France. No, it is thereby simplified. If England understood her strength, she would know that she requires no allies. Perhaps the mere substitution of the word "war" for the word she has too often used, "peace," would put an end to this continued European crisis ; and if more than the word and the determination were requisite, the destruction of a *weak and exposed* arsenal (whatever may have been said to the contrary) suffices to take from Russia all power of injury, which would be the sole object of a war, with a power with which we have nothing to do, save to prevent her practical interference in a country where, as yet, she is only powerful because she has duped us into supporting her.

—But what can be said of the Government of France, in thus digging its grave by the very side of so many fatal monuments, with the very tools that have inhumed its predecessors. Russia holds out to the Chief of that State admission to the bosom of legitimacy. She may add other considerations—a continental union against the commerce of England—an Egyptian and an African dominion for France—two objects of traditional ambition ; and for this the King of the French seals

his own doom, by the mere fact of his union with Russia ; and France, if such a project could be carried through, sacrifices her union with England—her influence in Italy—her character everywhere—and allows Russia to occupy Constantinople, the commencement of a new order of things, and the tomb of all that exists.

It is strange that France does not recollect, for any useful purpose, that there was a Napoleon, whose ambition and wilfulness may have been wrong, but whose master-mind grasped as it were with the precision of instinct all political combinations. Can France forget, that Napoleon, at war with England, and the ally of Russia, refused his sanction to the possession of the Dardanelles by Russia, although this would have been purchased by Russia's support in the subjugation to France of the whole of continental Europe? Can France forget, that he who extended her empire north, south, east, and west, and raised her to the very pinnacle of human greatness—he who despised Russia, as she is, should have looked on her possession of the Dardanelles as raising that barbarous power to a preponderance over his own France which would end by crushing France? This conviction his political life has proclaimed—this is the political testament he has left to his heedless country — this the warning to Europe, expressed in terms that must arrest and

rivet the attention of every listener,—“ MY NAME
 “ WILL BE PRONOUNCED WITH RESPECT WHEN
 “ THE SOUTHERN PROVINCES OF EUROPE ARE
 “ A PREY TO THE BARBARIANS OF THE
 “ NORTH !!”

London, March 25th, 1835.

FINIS.

EFFECT ON ENGLAND

First the attention of every Englishman is directed to the fact that the Prussian Government has been the first to announce its intention of sending a large expedition to the East, to the assistance of the British Government, in the event of a war with Russia.

RUSSIAN

London, March 25th, 1885.

COMMERCIAL LEAGUE

LONDON :

PRINTED BY T. BRETTELL, RUPERT STREET, HAYMARKET.

1885


Extracted from "The Eastern and Western Review," Vol. II.

LONDON :

JAMES BRETTELL & SONS, 10, FLEET STREET.

1885

Printed by
T. Brettell



Urquhart, David

The sultan Mahmoud and Mehemet Ali Pasha

London 1835

Turc. 239 I

urn:nbn:de:bvb:12-bsb10787252-4